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PREFACE
I~hile often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts of students
should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefully will encourage scholarly
research by students and provide a means by which their efforts will be reco gnized. Phi Alpha Theta is grea tl y indebted to the History Department of
I~estern Kentucky University head d by Dr. Ri chard Tr outman .
I<e are gr ateful
to our Consul t ing Editors, Dr . Charles Bussey , Dr . Ca r ol Crowe Carraco, a nd
Dr . David Lee, for their assistance in this proje c t. For their tireless and
exacting effor t Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typists, Lecia Mayhugh and Ruth
Cornelius . Our most profound deb t of gratitude goes to the contributing
writers--those who were published and those who were not -- that constitute a
group which forms the heart of any publication .

The logo of Phi Alpha Theta appears on the cover of the journal. The
six-pointed s tar, which is composed of two triangles, is worked in black
enamel and laid on a circular frame, the whole encircled by a Serpent. Thr ee
forces may be thought of as controlling man a nd the universe: the Fa ther,
the I<ord, and the Spirit - a trinity which is symbolized by one of the
triangles. Ancient philosophers believed that man and the world were made
of thre elements - Spirit , Blood , and I<ater. These are represented by
the second triangle of the St ar . The triangle with apex below the base
symbolizes the spiritual a nd divine . The Greek letter Pi signifies Pater
(Father), and letter Psi signifies Psyche (Spi rit), and th e lett er Lambda
signifies Logos (I'ord). The triangle with apex above th e base symbolizes
the earthly and human . The letter Alpha signifies Ha ima (Blood), the
letter Upsilon signifies Hydor (I~ater), and the let t er Psi signifies Psyc he
(Spi rit) .
The union of these two triangles forming the six-pointed s t ar (the
Ancient Assyrian sign of divinity) symbolizes the intima t e relation between the divine and the human . By some ancient peoples the Serpent was
regarded as a symbol of eternity, good fortune , and plenty . In our symbolism ,
it signifies happiness , fruitfulness and eternit y . IHthin the two triangles
are the three letters Phi, Alpha , Theta - Phil i a , Anthropos , Theos - signifying
Love , Nan, God .
Et a Pi Chap t er
Phi Alpha The t a
I<estern Kentu cky Univer sity
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JAMES ED"rARD OGLETHORPE:

CmIl1ANDER- I '- CHIEF FOR THE

FORCES OF SOUTH CAROL! A AND GEORGIA , 1738-43
James Edward Oglethorpe, most often remembered as the h umanitarian fo unde r
o[ the colony of Georgia, played an equally important role as defender of the
British claim on t he southern f r ontier of America . More t han anyo ne els e, it
was Oglethorpe who obtained men and money for the es t ablishme nt of t he Br it ish
lin of defense against the Spanish in Florida. Yet his mili t a r y exploits ar e
overshadowed by the settlement and reform efforts that took place with in th e
colony. The fac t remains, however, it was James Oglethorpe whom Ki ng Geor ge
II entrusted with the militarv responsibilitv for South Ca r olina and Geor gia
during the \,ar of Jenkins ' Ear .
He was born on December 22 , 1696 , the ninth child of Theophilus and Eleano r
Oglethorpe . His fa t her was a member of the English gentry who , i n 1709 , purchased a commission for James as Ensign in Her ~bjesty ' s Footgua rd s , an e lite
regiment assigned t o the palace . l Four years late r young Ogle thor pe wa s appointed Captain of the Footguards with the r ank of Lieutenant , but th e a cquisition of officer ' s rank marked the end of his early milita r y career fo r his
parents insisted upon the completion of his educa tion . I n 1713 Ogl e t horp e
enter d Eton Co llege a nd la t e r wen t to Oxfo r d t o complete hi s s t udies a t Co r pus
Christi College, but after only t wO years he lef t s chool t o be with hi s famil y
in France . Although e nroll d in an Academy , Og l ethorpe ' s des ir e fo r th e mi litary returned a nd in 1717 he joined the army of Pr i nce Eugene of Sa voy , t hro ugh
purchase of another commission . 2 Op,lethorpe never disting uished hi mse l f in
battle and soon realized that his capabilities and enthusiasm for a mil i t a r y
life were both less than anticipated . Instead , upon returning to his homeland ,
h secured a seat in Parliament and entered English politics .
In 1729, as Chairman of a House of Commons committee, Oglethorpe exposed
the deplorable condi t ions of gaols in which debtor s were placed . His i nves tiga tive actions revealed the corrupt prison system in England , an issue wh ich
Ogl e thorpe exploi t ed for personal gain in Parliament, a nd one which in t urn ,
prec eded his most notable achievement . 3 In 1732 he devised a pl a n by wh i ch
England might alleviate its overcrowded gaols and reduce unemployment by providing a new area of settlement on the southern fron t ier o[ America . 4 Such a
co lony would be impor t ant in several respects : i t would relocate the les s fo rtunat e , aid the mercantile policy of trade wi t h Ame r ica, and expand Br i ti s h
in f lue nce in the south . The p,reatest contribu t ion , however, would be t he
establishment of a buffer zone between the English settlemen t s i n Sou t h Ca r ol ina
and the Spanish in Florida . With these benefits i n mind , Geo r ge 11 char t er ed
the co lony of Georgia on April 23 . 1732 .
In November of the same year . Oglethorpe and t he fi r st gro up of se tt ler s
cross ed the Atlantic and landed at Charlestown in Janua r y, 1733. Wit hin week s,
the co lonists selected a high bluff on the Savannah River on which t o es t ab lish
the f irst settlements in Georgia. However, the area was already inhabi t ed by
the Yamacraw Indians who, although peaceful, were nevertheless ca u ti ous of t he
\4hi t intruders. Oglethorpe nego tia ted immedia tely a trea t y wi t h Tomochic hi ,
chieftain of t he Yamacraws, which was beneficial t o bo th pa rt ies . Ogle t ho r pe
David Dalton
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promised fair trading practices from English merchants and a fair price for land
in return for an alliance with the Indians. 5
During the years 1734-35, as new settlers began to arrive with some degree
of regularity, Oglethorpe directed the building of a series of fortifications
along the Georgia coastline to extend and strengthen the British claim. The
construction of these forts intensified uneasy feelings between the two nations,
and Oglethorpe received an additional 700 men from the English standing army as
well as being commissioned Brigadier-General and Commander-in-Chief of all forces
in the southernmost colonies. 6
In an attempt to pacify relations in America, Oglethorpe and the Spanish
Governor of Florida, Moral Sanchez, reached a tentative agreement called the
Treaty of Frederica. The terms of the document stated that each nation would
refrain from harassing tactics, control their respective Indian allies, and
allow the mother countries to decide any territorial disputes. Oglethorpe also
agreed t o abandon some of his southernmost forts, but these terms enraged the
Spanish King, Philip V, who recalled Sanchez and repudiated the treaty.7
Oglethorpe sensed that fighting would occur eventually between the two
colonial powers and that Georg ia, a buffer zone, would become a major theater
of operations in the south. He was attending a tribal council of Indian allies
when news of war reached him in 1740. The Indians demonstrated their allegiance
to Oglethorpe, as it was they who supplied the first information of Spanish
troop movements in Florida. A small party of Creeks, while on a hunting expedition into northern Florida, discovered a Spanish plan to sail against Oglethorpe's forts. Furthermore, Oglethorpe learned that the Spanish had killed
two unarmed Scottish Highlanders during a raid on Amelia Island . 8 War and
bloodshed was now a reality in America, and Oglethorpe determined to lead his
British forces to victory.
Early in 1740 Oglethorpe mobilized his men for an offensive into Florida.
His objective was St. Augustine, the key port for commerce that passed between
Spain and her rich Caribbean colonies. This trade route was of utmost importance because if it were severed, the Spanish "ar effort would be affected in
Georgia as well as in Europe.9 In late February a British fleet, under the
command of Commodore Vincent Pearse, started patrolling the Florida coast to
prevent supplies from reaching St. Augustine. Parliament, meanwhile, appropriated the money Oglethorpe requested for the campa ign, and South Carolina
voted to send 400 men to Georgia for the offensive.
Oglethorpe commanded a military force consisting of his Indian allies,
South Carolina militia, troops from England, and local Georgians. Also at his
disposal was the fleet under Pearse . Oglethorpe planned to assemble his forces
at the St. Johns River in northern Florida as soon as possible, then take St .
Augustine before the advent of summer. But the South Carolina troops, under
the command of Alexander Vanderdrussen, were deliberate in their movements
which disrupted the original plan of a pre-s ummer campaign . Oglethorpe grew
impatient and declared, "the longer we delay attacking them, the stronger they
will be. "10 Vanderdrussen made contact finally with the expedition in early
Hay, and Oglethorpe set out for St. Augustine with more than 1500 men under his
command .
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On May 12, 1740, the combatants approached a small camp, Fort Diego . Oglethorpe demanded and received its immediate surrender . 11 Although no one knew
it a t the time, this encounter was the on ly real vic t o r y of the expedition for
the British force. 12 A week later Ogletho r pe and Pea rs e decided , based upon
their limited information of the defenses at St . Augustine, that a two-front
a tcack was the best course o[ action, with Ogle thorpe driving the civilians out
of the town and into the fort, which Pea rse a nd his fleet would then bomba rd
into submission .
In late May the invading force moved further south to For t Hosa, an abandoned
settleme nt only two miles north of St . Augustine. l-lhen Og l ethorpe reconnoitered
the area , however, he r ealized that the impregnable walls of St . Augustine made
a frontal attack impossible . Horeover, the Spanish had placed six half - ga lleys
in the shal low wa t ers surrounding th e for t, a nd th ese small vessels , armed with
nine pound cannon, wo uld prevent Pearse from moving int o position fo r his bomoa rdment of the fort. In order for the British flee t ca nnon to be effec t ive,
Pearse would have to en t er th e harbor and subject his ships t o a crossfire from
the fort and the half- galleys, something ,~hich he was not willing to do . Therefo r e , without cannon support f r om the fleet, the original plan of Oglethorpe
was discarded and a new scheme devised. Pearse recommended that a siege be
implemented with his ships producing the necessary blockade, but he stipulated
that if the Spanish did not submit by July 5 , he would disemba rk and return to
England . His cour of naval duty would have then expired, and the hurricane
season would be app r oaching . 13 With no other immediace al ternatives, Ogle th orpe
co nsented reluctantly.
As days turned into weeks, the Spanish showed no sig ns of surrendering .
Obviously, the food supply within the fort was greater than ancicipated and
Oglethorpe , impatient for action , decided to elimina te the half - gal ley s in the
harbor . A new plan developed as Pearse secured Anast asia Island, east of the
[art, where cannon wer e placed to fire upon the small vessels. Another battery
was locat ed on Point Quartell, nort heast of St . Augustine, und er the direction
of Vanderdrussen, to f ire upon the fo rt. During the after noon of June 14,
Oglet horp e received word that all troops were in position for the assaul t upon
the half-galleys a nd fort, but he de cided to wait a nd a ttack at dawn . This
decision was the turnin g poi nt of the St. Augustine campaign .
Upon his arrival at Fort Mosa several we eks earlier, Oglethorpe dispatched
a small number of men t o pa tr ol the area daily and to be cons tantly on the move.
If the Spanish were a'~are of the pa trol 's loca tion, they would be f r ee to roam
elsewhere and resup ply their stock of food. BlIt as the days of marching became
monoto nous and the scorching heat bore down upo n them, the disillusioned soldiers
camped outside Fort Mosa.1 4 The food supply within St. Augustine was nearing
ex haustinn when the Spanish Governor of Florida, Manuel de Montiano , conceived
a pre-dawn attack upon t he British. He assembled 300 men and whil e the invaders
slept , the Spaniards attacked . Earlier that morning, the 15th, Oglethorpe 's
Rangers reported that th ey had heard Spanish Indians doing a wa r dance, but the
informa ti on was discarded a nd no alarm raised by the English. 15 Oglethorpe's
men were caught asleep, unarmed, a nd unprepared fo r a fight . The a ttack became
a r out with over 65 Englishmen killed and 34 imprisoned o ut of a total of 135
men. Two days before t he a tta ck, the Spanish were almost ready t o acknowledge
defeat; now they refused to yield t o Op.lethorpe's demands for surrender . 16
This debacle demoralized the British tr oops , yet Oglethorpe was more determined
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than ever to ca rry out his mission . On June 21 he commenced a four day bombardment of the fort, which did not induce the Spanish to s ubmission nor silence their
guns.
Oglethorpe was und ersta ndably puzzled as to what his next move should be .
He had tried several tactics but none had succeeded . Vanderdrussen opted for a
night raid, but Pearse disapproved because he was wary of the shallow water around
the fort. Next, Vanderdrussen proposed a battery be set up to control access to
the mouth of the St. Sebastion River . If this could be accomplished, St. Augustine
would be encompassed and all supplies would be halted. However, the new plan required at least seven more ships, and on June 26, Pearse stated bluntly that he
would not assist in the new endeavor. No~' within a week of his departure, he
would not risk any ships or men, leaving Oglethorpe t o combat the Spanish as best
he could.
As the hot, sultry days ushered in the month of July, a series of events
guaranteed Oglethorpe ' s fail ur e in Florida. On July 3, some small vessels were
able to slip past the English fleet and resupply St. Augustine with food. With
the fort partially resto cked , all prospect of starving the enemy in the near
future was lost . The fleet was leaving in only two days, Oglethorpe ' s own men
were disgruntled, and most of the Carolina troops were sick or fatigued as a
result of the humid summer days. Finally, Oglethorpe himself fell ill with fever,
and on July 4, 1740, he o rdered a retr eat to Georgia.
The expedition was a failure, but "ho was to blame? Obviously, Oglethorpe's
origi nal plan of a combined land and sea attack required almost perfect coordination, sometimes difficult under the best of circumstances and not feasible under
the exis ting condi tions. }Ioreover. Op.lethorpe planned originally for an early
spring assault on the fortress , but had to wait until Hay, when additional help
arrived in the person of Vanderdrussen and his men. Furthermore, some of Oglethorpe's own men diSObeyed his orders at Fort Hosa and paid the price with their
lives . If they had been on patrol as instructed, a successful Spanish attack
was improbable and supplies as well as morale withjn the fort would have continued
In decline.
The fleet, under Pearse, was another factor in the failure of the campaign.
Pearse a nd his ships proved to be no more than spectators throughout the offensive.
By allowing the half-galleys to control the harbor, without at tempting to eliminate them, Pearse crippled Oglethorpe's principle plan of attack . The fleet cannon
did fire upon the fort, but inflicted no serious damage, and when several ships
pulled back from their origi nal positions, the siege collapsed . Pearse seemed
not to care ; his main concern was the security of his ships, not the capture of
St. Augustine. His lack of initiative was an open invitation to the Spanish,
who responded by slipping a number of small vessels through the loosely constructed blockade.
Oglethorpe also must bear partial r espo nsibility for the defeat . He commanded a formidable army, yet never utilized the full potential of the force. After
his first abortive attempt, Oglethorpe was seemingly mystified and relied on subordinates, whose plans likewise met with failure. He must also accept blame for
the fiasco outside Fort Hosa . Although not present at the attack, the men were
under his command and, therefore, they were his responsibility. Lastly, Oglethorpe
was ill with fever, another el .. ment which must be considered when recounting his
inability to capture St. Augustine.
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But possibly the ~rea test reason for the f a ilure o f the expedition was the
determined Spanish resistance . \~hile Oglethorpe led his troops through northe r n
Florida, Montiano withdr w hi s men to their best equipped location, St. Augus tin e .
By placing the half- galleys in the harbor , the Spani.sh dealt a mortal blow to t he
original plan o[ Oglethorpe , as the fleet was forced to anchor offsho r e . When
Hon tiano devised a pre- dawn :1 t tack upon .on "reo} whi ch OPo ] etho rpe occupi.ed , it
was s uccessful no t only in defeating the English and acquiring badly needed food ,
but it also provided the extra incentive necessary to hold out during the siege .
It was a tired , disappointed man, sick with fever who drew his army back
before the walls of St . Augustine , but if Oglethorpe had failed in his prima r y
objective , he had at least succeeded in delaying a Spanish attack on Georgia .1 7
During t he spring of 1741 Ogle thorpe strengthened his fo rtifications , repaired
old batter ies , and made several appeals for additional men , but England co ul d
not spare any t roops because of t he continental war I.lith Spain . In a let t er
wr it ten t o Sir Robert Walpole, England ' s leading minister, Oglethorpe reported
that he had fortified as well as he could all t he outposts . all t hat r emai ned
was to wait . 18 Bu t the Spanish did not appear that year and 1741 passed withoue any serious

encounter~ .

Oglethorpe . by his failure in Florida and th

absence of an expec t ed Spanish

counterattack , dre,,, into ques t ion his competence as th e mili t ary leader of Georgia ,

but at a time when he well co uld have been discouraged . the summe r of 1 742 prod uced
the most glo rious incident in Oglethorpe's ca reer as a soldier . 19 During May ,
he received reports of g r eat ly increased travel b tween Cuba and St. Augus t i ne;
Montiano IoTas being res up plied and an attack on Georgia ap peared forthcomi ng. The
Creeks confirmed this news as they skirmished with a Spa nish sco utin g pa rt y wi th i n
Georgia ' s boundaries . Although the tension eased for a time as excess i ve rains
fel l for a two week period, when they subsided on J une 21 . 1742 , the Spa n is h exchanged cannon fire with Fort Prince William on the souther n tip of Geor gia . The
long dreaded invasion had begun . 20
Montiano, again the leader of the Spanish , commanded a f l ee t of 51 s hip s
and almost 2 , 000 soldier s . 21 He planned to inv ade St . Simons Isla nd , work hi s
way up the coastline to Fort Frederica , and eventually into Sout h Ca r o lina . He
was instructed by Philip V to conduct his campaigns wi t h a mi nimum l oss of Spa ni s h
lives . On June 27, Ogletho rp e arrived at Fort St . Simons . Even with additional
troops from Fort Frederica, his total force in Georgia numbered no mo r e th a n
1,000 men. Oglethorpe had no nav y , except for a few small vessels, but he was
de termin ed to infli c t as much damage an the enemy at St . Simons as possible . I f
his defense" could "'ithstand the Spanish attack for an extended pe r iod of time ,
Oglet horpe hoped that additional men co uld be secured from So ut h Carolina .
As morning dawned, June 28. the main elements of t he Spa nish flee t appea r ed
off St . Simons Island . But once again, the weather interve ned as t he pr evai ling
wind direction prevented the ships from entering t he channel. Ogl e thorp e used
this delay to s t rengthen his defenses, and by the time th e Spa nis h wer e r ea dy
to attack , he had more than one- ha l f of his total fo r ce on St . Si mons . 22 On
July 5, the wind and tide were both righ t to enter the chan nel a nd t he Spanish
exchanged fire with Oglethorpe ' s cannon, but the ships wer e able t o sli p pas t
and outflank the garrison . As darkness fell , Ogle t ho r pe wi thdr ew t o For t Fred e r ica
with all th e artillery and supplies tha t could be t ranspo rt ed; t he r emai nde r was
destroyed . 23 Two days later, the most impo rt ant con t ac t be t ween t he oppo s ing
armies occ ur ed at tt Bloody Harsh . "

~1ontiano

sent o u t a small de tachment t o s c out
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the island, but as the Spanish advanced, they encountered Oglethorpe's Rangers
on patrol . Each side fired several shots and the Rangers scurried back to Fort
Frederica to report the clash . Oglethorpe assumed immediately this force to be
Mon tiano ' s frontal a t tack and he ordered his Indian allies and Bri tish regulars
forward to skirmish against the enemy. The Spanish advanced to within one mile
of Fort Frederica before they were engaged by Oglethorpe and his men . In close
fighting, the British proved to be most effective and overwhelmed the invaders .
This small battle left 36 Spaniards killed, wounded or captured whereas Oglethorpe lost only one man.
When the remnants of the Spanish scouting party returned to camp and reported
the clash, Montiano became enraged and ordered an additional 200 men to march back
and clear the way for his invading force . Meanwhile. Oglethorpe placed his men
at strategic positions throughout a tvooded, marshy area on the trail to Frederica ,
and as the Spanish troops approached, the hidden Englishmen fired a volley. Dense
undergrowth limited visibility, yet each side fired at will. The English line
broke, however, when they realized the Spanish were far superior in numbers. \~en
Oglethorpe heard the sound of renewed fighting he hastened to the scene of battle,
only to find his troops retreating in disarray. 24 Oglethorpe encouraged his men
to hold their positions and the English counterattacked with Oglethorpe leading
the charge. Although he had less than one- half the number of the Spanish army,
Oglethorpe routed the advance force of Montiano and the English pursued until
they were within a mile of the main body of the Spanish camp. But after viewing
the Spanish entrenchments, Oglethorpe decided to march back to Frederica, rest
his men and wait for a better opportunity to strike the Spanish . 25
On July 9, a Spanish deserter informed Oglethorpe of the declining morale
among the enemy, and three days later. Oglethorpe and his men advanced toward
Montiano in a daring night raid.

Their surprise attack was spoiled how'ever, when

a soldier fired his musket and fled to the enemy's lines. It is not known whether
the musket was fired on purpose or by accident, but Montiano was alerted to the
presence of the English, and Oglethorpe returned to Frederica . 26
During the next week Oglethorpe penned a letter to his musket-firing deserter,
instructing him to understate the strength of the English army and add other details
which would induce Montiano to attack. In actuality, the understatement of strength
was very close to the truth, but ~Iontiano did not knm" this. Oglethorpe placed
the letter within a Spanish prisoner's belongings and set him free , knowing he
would return to his camp.27 Immediately upon arriving, the freed Spaniard under'vent questioning and a search revealed the letter which was given to Montiano, who
became very suspicious of it . That same afternoon, five British commer cial vessels
were spotted to the north of St . Simons. These ships posed no threat to the Spanish,
but Montiano questioned whether or not they \.Jere a forerunner of the naval support
which Oglethorpe lacked, and i f so , the entire Spanish fleet could be trapped Vlithin
the harbor . Faced with these circumstances, Montiano ordered an immediate retreat
from St. Simons I sland and by July 15, the Spanish fleet was offshore at Fort
Prince Hill i am , heading for St . Augus t i ne . This departure marked Spain ' s las t full
scale a t tempt t o dislodge the British f r om the southern frontier of America . 28
The expUlsion of the Spanish and the successf ul defense of Georgia by Oglethorpe was the result of many diverse elements . Often overlooked by con temporaries,
the weather pl ayed a role in determining the victory . Ifhen heavy ra i ns fell i n
June, the Span i sh were prevented from mobilizi ng accord ing to schedul e , and when
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they ar rived a t St . Simons, the wind and tide combined to prohibit the ships from
entering the harbor . This delay allowed Ogletho r pe addi tional time to prepare
his defenses .
Furthermore , Hontiano ' s inability to conunand troo ps in offensive action has tened the English vic t ory . The Spanish commande r had twic e as many men as Oglethorpe and easily could have outnumbered his opponent , had he been willing to send
out a s ufficient number of troops against Fo rt Frederica . Hontiano ' s co ns ervativ e
natu re led to his own defeat . Horeover, Philip V' s order for a minimal loss of
life preRerved the victory . Although Ho n tiano possessed incomp l ete information
concerni ng Oglethorp e ' s defenses, he was co nfident of victory . But when British
vessels appeared off the coast , Hontiano withdrew his men fearing a naval conflict
in which his f l ee t could be inferior, and at the very least , trapped within the
harbor .
Oglethorpe can accept all the honors bestowed for the s uccess f ul defense of
Georgia . He was much better suit d for defensive manoeuvring of troops, and demonstrated a courageous vigor in the fighting . rallying , and leading of his men to
victory . Given the vast difference in size of fo rces, Oglethorpe displayed an
unusual abil it y t o use effectively his limited resources , and even psychological
warfare on his opp on ent. Only two yea r s after his rebuff in Florida , Oglethorpe
had developed th e qual ities o[ a s uccessf ul defensive soldier .
Sev ral weeks after the Spanish depa rtur e , a relief fleet from South Car olina
anchored a t For t Frederica . 1.1 th six Bri tish Hen of I.ar, six smaller armed vessels
and several sco u ting boats, Oglethorpe ordered a naval counterat t ack upon St .
Au~ustine .
The small navy appeared off t he Spanish fortress in late August, 1742 .
The half-galleys still blockaded the harbor , but since Oglethorpe possessed smaller
ships, which could enter the shallow waters , he fel t confident of elimina ting the
pesky vessels . But a high tide and strong surf prevent ed his s hips from ent e ring
the harbor for seve r al days, and with hurricane season approaching rapidly, Oglethorpe decided to return to t he safety of his colony . 29
In the spring of 1743 he tried once more t o conquer St . Augustine . By dispatching his men in small groups, marching co nstantly and r avagi ng the area around
the fo rt, Ogle thorpe hoped to lure the Spanish ou t to skirmish agains t his forces.
But they were not duped by such tactics and refu sed to leave their garrison. Several we ks later Oglethorpe ord red his fo r ces back t o Georgia, resigned to his
failure to cap ture the elusive Spanish base . He would not try again t o take St .
Augustine .
Oglethorpe sailed for England in late 174 3 t o explore th e curr ent si tuation
on the continent . He was never to return to Georg ia . In March , 1744, Oglethorpe
received his own regiment of Britjsh troops and a commission as Ha jor- Genera l , but
the rank was short-lived . The following yea r fo rmal cou rt martial cha r ges were
brought agains t him for neglect of duty, when he failed to guard effectively an
escape route which Scottish r ebels used to elude cap tur e . Oglethorpe resigned
his commission , and although acquitted of the charge , his life as a soldier ended . 30
James Oglethorpe exhibited personal courage , ene r gy, and determination du r ing
his campaigns i n the south . He possessed an inner fe rvor as field commander, a nd
despit his fail ures at St. Augustine, he s uccessfully defended his own territory,
his own home, his own dream . Although Oglet horpe tri ed to cap tur e St . Augus tin e
on sev ral occasions, it was his refusal t o yield t o the Spanish invasion of Georgia
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which was of far greater militarv i~portancc. Oglethorpe's life as a soldier took
him from standard European tactics in 1718 to guerilla tactics against the Spanish
in 1742 . He experienced both success and failure on the battlefield, but it was
his victorious defensive campai~n of Georgia which preserved his reputation as a
soldier . During his lif time, James Edward Oglethorpe founded Georgia, adminis tered to its every need, and successfully defended the British claim on the southern frontier of America .

9
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CHARLES DICKENS:
SOCIAL CONSCIENCE OF VICTORIAN ENGLAND
The richest and most complex portrait of Victorian England was not drawn
with pastels and paints, but with pen and ink; its artist was not Hogarth or
Hillais or Rosetti, but a novelist whose name has become synonymo us with nineteenth cen tury England: Charles Dickens . Recognized by literary critics and
historians alike for his panoramic view of English life, Dickens created in his
twenty major novels an imaginary world that chronicles what has become "typically
Victorian ." He was, however, a pioneer of sorts, for he chose to write about
scenes from English life that had always been considered inappropriate for literature, "low" material as it was called. And this decision marks a departure
not only for literature, but for Dickens, who had, with sensitive perception,
seen changes occurring in English life, changes precipitated by increased industrialization which brought new problems to England and new cha llenges to the
English government . As he attacked these problems in his la t er novels, his
numerous essays, and speeches, Dickens emerged as an effective and i nd ignant
voice of protest against what he saw as raging social injustice and against a
government which he began to believe was unable to cope with the problems .
This pessimism pervades his later novels.
The social novel surfaced in the 1830's as a partial outgrowth of the political agitation of the time. Romanticism, a dying form with its emotionalism
and idealism, fo und a partial rebirth in political and social aspirations and a
vehicle in the novel. l While all of Dickens ' novels reflect this growing awareness of the power o[ literature in attacking social wrongs, it is his work of
the 1840 ' s and 1850's that best illustrates Dickens' reform tendencies. By this
time, Dickens had come to view pessimistically "his society as a muddle of greed,
selfishness, snobbery, and bungling inefficiency,"2 and to fear the threat to
the individual , the degradation of human spontaneity, that went hand in hand with
the triumph of machinery and industrialization. 3 Man, he believed, was becoming
"isolated in a world of increasing ugliness and diminishing meaning."4 In novel
nfter novel from this period, Dickens indicted the various forces of society that
imprison the individual; in Bleak House, the law; in Hard Times, industry; in
Great Expectations, class; in Our Mutual Friend , money ; the great Dickens' theme
of the individual against society emerged again and again as a poignant cry.S
Dickens once wrote, "I am a Reformer heart and soul," but while he consistently denounced the evils in his world, he never proposed feasible alternatives
to them. 6 His crusades, however, were diverse.
Maybe the best statement of
his sympathies is found in the introduction to Household Words, a publication
that, because of its nature, afforded Dickens, as its editor, a greater forum
to attack social injustice. He wrote that it [Household Hords]

consistently opposes racial, national, religious and class
prejudices . It crusades against illiteracy, and in favor of
government aid for public education and free elementary and
industrial schools for the poor . It crusades for proper sewage disposal, cheap and unlimi ted wa ter supply, and the r egulation of industries vital to health . It demands the replacement of slums by decent housing for the poor , pleads for the
Hary Lou Nathews
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establishment 0 playgrounds for children, and advocates systematic municipal planning. .
It insists that industrialists
must not be a lowed to mutilate and kill their labourers in orde r
to save the cost of pr venting an accident. . . . it calls upon
the working class to use its power to turn th e ' Indifferents and
the Incapable' out of Downing Street and l-1estminister and force
the government to remedy the ills from which poor men s uffer .7
Obv i ously, Household Words was to be the social conscience of Vic torian England
"n d Cha rles Dickens was to be th e voice .
I~o were the villains in Dickens ' eyes?
Basically, th y were os t en tatious
and money-grubbing men whose absence of proper values , lack of altrui stic emotions, and ruthless egotism had set them apart . Sometimes they were big businessmen , the new bourgeois, who advocated orthodox political economy (Ralph
Nickleby, Scrooge , Jonas Chuzzlewit , Hr . Dombey , Grad grind , and Bounderby) and
who were vain and selfish, "preoccupil'd with superficial appearances and ob sessed with the attempt to conceal their humble origins and the novelty of
their wealth ." S Yet, Dickens also attacks specific institutions : the legal
system, the debtor ' s prison, schools, Parliamen t, and the Church .

However , while Dickens criticizes society ' s institutions , h sympathizes
with those who are th e unwitting victims of them . This sympathy is first with
children . A r e trospective gla nce at Dickens ' nove ls reveals a bulk of wo rk
obs ssed with the plight of the child . Starting wi th the autobiog rap hical
David Copperfield, Dickens worked child r en into his plots , often using a child
as the center of the work. These were , however, usually not children from the
middle class , but lost, unloved children whos e lives were bleak , darkened by
horrible experiences su ch as his hildhood job in a blacking factory . I t was
this kind of exploi t a ti on of child r en that Dickens a ttacked as unjust. 9 I n
Great Expectations, Dickens wrote,

In the lit t le world in which children have their existence,
whosoeve r brings them up, there is no t hing so finely perceived
and so finely felt as injustice . It may be only small injus tice that the child can be exposed to but the child is
small, and its world is Rmnll .
lJithin myself , I had
s ustained from my babyhood , a p rpetual conflict with injustice . lO
Dickens repeatedly remind d th En~lish people that t he " seeds of i t s certai n
ruin" were sown in the negl ct of the children . He was appalled by r eports
showing that opium was administer d to small children , and he deplored the
negligent society that allowed 30,000 poor child r en in the stree t s of London
to be "hunted , flogged, imprison d" while "the Priests and Teachers of al l
denominations say ' Teach this!--Teach that! --Teach t'oth er--' and the Hinister
of State, though distressed by the spec t acle shr ugged his shoulder a nd replied
'It is a grea t wrong-- BUT IT I.1ILL l.AST ~1Y TUIE !' "11 His conce rn fo r children
is further revealed in The Uncommercial Traveller :
I cou ld enter no other houses for that o ne while , for I could
not bear the contemplation of the ch ild r en . Such heart as I
had summoned to sustain me aga inst th e miseri es of th e a dults
failed me when T looked a t the ch ildr en . I saw how young they
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were, how hungry, how serious, and still. I thought of them,
sick and dying in those lairs . I think of them dead without
anguish; but to think of them so suffering and so dying quite
unmanned me. 12
However, it is not iust children who evoke such feelings in Dickens . He
was "passionately on the side of anyone who was weak or oppressed " 13 and his
heart "was wrung by the long hours, unhealthy conditions, and inadequate wages
. . of the working class. "14 In a speech made at Boston on February 1, 1842,
on one of his American tours, Dickens reflected on his faith in the people:
I believe that Virtue shows quite as well in rags and patches
as she does in purple and fine linen . I believe that she and
every beautiful object in external nature, claim some sympathy
in the breast of the poorest man who breaks his scan t y loaf of
daily bread. I believe that she dwells rather oftener in alleys
and by-ways than she does in courts and places . .
15
Much of the blame for the deplorable conditions of the poor rested, Dickens
believed, on the shoulders of Parliament. His distaste for that institution
dates from his early career as a reporter for The Mirror of Parliament; in 1832,
the times were exciting as the Reform Bill stirred the diverse passions in the
English people . At that time , Dickens wrote, "we have visited it quite often
enough [or our purposes, and a great deal too often for our personal peace and
comfort." Later, he wrote, " I suppose it is something peculiar in my constitution, but I can not imagine how any man of worth can endure the personal con-

templation of the House of Commons . "16 By the 1850's, Dickens viewed English
government even more contemptibly. He called Parliament a "Great Dust Heap
down at \vestminister" and " the dreariest failure and nuisance that ever bothered

this much bothered world . "17

Government, Dickens felt, had retreated from its

responsibilities, especially to the people whose discontent was "smoldering,"
waiting for lIanyone of a thousand accidents" to turn it into "a devil of a

conflagra tion . " 18 Ignoring its paternalistic duties , the government was letting the people subside into poverty , hunger, and lethargy. As he wrote to
Dr. Southwood Smi th ,
. I greatly fear that until Governments are honest, and
Parliament pure, and great men less considered, and small men
more so, it is almost a Cruelty to even the dreadful hours and
ways of Labor which at this time prevail. I,ant is so general ,
distress so great, and Poverty so rampant--lt is, in a word,
so h"rd for the millions to live by any means -- that I scarcely
know how we can step between them and one weekly farthing .

19

Even later, in a speech at Birmingham on January 6, 1860, Dickens quoted from
H. T. Buckle History of Civilization in England , saying that "law~ivers are nearly
always the obstructors of SOCiety instead of the helpers . . . . "
His general

°

attitude was that those who governed were more concerned about appearances and

official dignity than social responsibility . 2l
Dickens ' novels from this period overflow with satire aimed at Parliament.
The most scathing attack may appear in Bleak House where Dickens denounced corrupt
elections and satirized an 1851 crisis when Lord John Russell resigned and no
minister could form a Cabinet unti 1 Russell was finally returned . Dickens wrote,

"L,>rU Cuodle would go nut, S'r Thomns Doodle wouldn't come in, and th re being
nobody in Great Britain (to speak of) except Coodle and Doodle, there has been
no Government ."22 Again in Nicholns Xicklebv, Dickens registered his disgust
for Parli ment when Nicholas applied for a iob as secretary to a member of Pa rliament. He quickly discover d that Mr. Gre~sbury was" hypo rite; icholas
had earlier overheard him tell a group of visitors "Thank heaven, I am a Briton
. . . . I am proud of this free :lnd happy country ." But, wh n the visitors
leave , h turned co "icholas and told him to get together "a few ittle flo ur ishing speeches of a patriotic cast" and to say good thing" about the people
"b cause it comes out well at election time . "2) The only purpose of the job ,
it seemed, was to assemble facts about finance and foreign po icy to cram into
his ignorant employer so he can make the correct speeches. In Hard Times ,
Dickens called Parliament Ita national cinder heap" and its members "national
dustmen. ,, 24 Little Dor ritt also attacks members of Parliament who "fetched
and carried, and toadied, and jobbed, and cor ru pted, and ate heaps of dirt";
he also satirizes government bureaucr. cy like his fictional Circumlocution
Office , controlled by the Barna Ie family ; when a vacancy occur r ed , they proposed one another for the position.25 It became an agency "dedicated to stiiling and suppressing all polit clll change nnd innovation . "26
n Bleak House,
Dickens created Sir Leicest r Dedlo k, a fine old English ~entlel!k~n . "only a
baronet , II but , "honourable obs t1 n:l te . . . intensely prejudiced nnd unreasonable
" Sir Leicester represented those who ruled Eng land thro u g h hodies like
the Co urt of Chancery ; this ba ron t "regards the Court of Chancery . . . as
sam thing devised . . . by the perfect ion of human wisdom, fo r the eternal se t LJement of very thing . .
To give the sa nction of his co unt na n ce to a ny
complaints respecting it . would be to encou r age some person in th e lower classes
to rise up somewhere . . . . ,, 27 An carlier passage from David Copperfield a t Lacked the same kind of red tapp and bureaucracy that engulfed Engla nd by comparing the country to a "trussed fowl . . . skewe r ed through and th r ough with
c.ffiee p ns and bound hand and foot with red tape . "28
As with many of his attacks al\ainst inius ti ees , Dickens failed to offer
any solution to the disa reeable situation he saw in government . His f utility
is voiced in an 1855 letter to Charles Macready :
As to suffrage , I hay' lost hope even in the ballot . \o/e appea r
to me to have proved the failure of rep res entative institutions
withou t an educated and advanced peop le to s u pport them .
what with flunkyism, tn dyism, lcttin~ the mos t contemptible
lords come in for all manner of places , 1 do reluc t antly b lieve
tha t the English p opJ e arc habi tua lly con senting parties t o
the miserable imbecil i ty into which ,ye have fall en, a nd n ev e r
will help themselves out of it . . .
At the present , we are
on the down hi 1 road to be conquered and the people WILL not
bear it. .
I have no present political fai th or hope--not
a grain . 29
In addition to the government , another perpetrator of social evil was the
c ity itself . Considered as the leading city in the world in the nine t een th
century, London was a great comm~ rcial cnter encompassing i n its boundaries
3 cross-section of humanity.
But, Dickens tended to see a nd to po rtra y London
30
as a city he called "a yost hopeless nursery of ignorance , miser y and vice . "
He again voiced his disgust of the city in a letter to Bulwer Lytton in 1851
when he called London " 0 vile place ." )l This same a ttitude a bout the ci t y is
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reflected in his novels where he associated the city with death and poverty .
Images of an "impure river ," "a squalid maze of streets ," "miserable houses,"
"wilderness of dirt, rags, and hunger" dot the pages of his books . The ultimate cure for the city's problem i s , once again , government action, but Dickens'
London, covered with fog and infected by polluted water, could get no aid from
a Chancery and a Parliament that he believed resisted any change. 32
Dickens did, however , become active in the movement to provide sanitation
and public housing for London . Responding to graphic and shocking reports
about public sanitation, Parliament finally established a General Board of
Health in 1848. However, the Board proved inefficient, stymied by petty quar rels and administrative infighting . The lurking dan er was cholera , which
annually threatened the city . In fact, 1848 brought a serious outbreak that
killed 14,000 in London alone, but, ironically, the Board exacerbated the situat ion by flushing the drains, an act which made the infection waterborne .
Dickens became involved in the public health crusade through his brother-inlaw , Henry Austin, who was secretary of the Hetropolitan Sanitary Conunission,
and Dr . Thomas Southwood Smith , a friend who was also active in the movement.
After this outbreak of cholera , Dickens wrote several scathing articles in
The Examiner and in Household Hords, and he began to make speeches, campaigning
actively for improved conditio ns. "Education and religion can do nothing where
they are most needed," Dickens argued, "unti l the ,yay is paved for their ministrations by Cleanliness and Decency," In his fiction, he also treated the

subject. Dombey and Son and Bleak House both advocated improved sanitation.
The Board of Health eventually died along with the Palmerston ministry in 1854,
but Dickens continued his advocacy of reform. In fact , his later essays in
Household \Yords on the subj ec t ring wi th radical thou gh t. Unfortuna tely, while
he was able to draw attention to the problem , he was not successful in finding
an effective remedy for it . 33
At the same time Dickens was lobbyin~ for sanitary reform, he was also
interested in public housing . Believing that Door housing indirectly caused
physical and m~ntal illness that crippled the poor , Dickens turned Bleak House
and Household Hords into a platform for various housing reforms. He convinced
Miss Angela Bur dette Coutts with whom he had worked in her Ura nia College, a
home for "fallen 'vornen," to .ioin in a project t o build workingmen 1 s housing .
\..]ith some friends, Dickens chose a site, known as Nova Scotia Gardens, and
hired an a rc hitect; at the same time, Miss Coutts purchased the land. The
project , underway at the same time Bleak House was, proposed to build clean ,
inexpensive housing for the poor . However, because of money difficulties, the

project was stalled for a short time, but Nova Scotia Gardens project was completed in 1859 . Later , Miss Coutts built another project adjacent to the first
one. Ironically , none of the model d,,/elling projects actually alleviated the
crowded housing situation. l"hen the model dwellings were built , they rehoused
fewer people than they had evicted . For example, the IHld Court renovation
project evicted around 1000 people, but rehoused only about three to four hundred of th em.

True to Dickens

I

form , he \.,;ras once again instrumental in defining

" serio us problem, but his lack o( understanding of housing problems hampered
the actual solution o( the problem . 34
Other targets of Dickens' crusading were the Poor Law and the workhouses
filled by that law . l"hile Dickens declared that he was in sympathy with the
intentions of the Poor Law--to cut down on able-bodied pauperi sm--h e deplored
its abuses .

In a postscript to Our Mutual Friend , he wrote. "I believe there
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has heen in England, since the days of the Stua rt s, no law so often infamously adminis t ered , no lat, so often openly violated, no law so habitually i11supervised .,,35 In Oliver Twist, Dickens attacked the Poor Law and its administration . Hr . Bumble, the padsh headle , runs t he workhouRe, an ac t that
was in violation of the spirit of the law : the framers of this law were suspicious of the beadles, and , wanting to see th em intelligently administered ,
provided official for workhouses. Howeve r, many parishes simply rehired the
beadles and provided them with new labels . This one, Hr. Bumble, reduced the
children 's diet to thin gruel, a noth er violation of the law which required that
children should get nutritious food : only able- bodi ed paupers were to be kept
on thin gruel . 36 One of the most dramatic scenes in Oliver Twis t depicts this
mistreatment :
The gruel disappeared: the boys whispered t o each other and
winked at Oliver while his next neighbors nudged him. Child
as he was, he was desperate with hunger, and reckless with
misery . He rose from the table; and advancing to the master,
basin and spoon in hand , said : somewha t ala rmed at his own
temerity : 'P lease ~ Sir, I want some more. I
Oliver's request for more food was treated as rebellion by th e masters :
The assistants wer paralyzed with wonder: the boys with fea r
. the mast er . . . shr; eked aloud for the beadle . The
boa rd were sitting in solemn conclave when Hr . Bumble rushed
i nto the room in quiet excit ment , and addressi ng the gentleman in the high hair said , ' Mr. Limbkins, I beg your pardon,
Sir ! Oliver Twist has asked for more !' There was a gene r al
sta rt; Horror was depicted on every countenance . . . 'That
boy will be hung ,' said th e gen tleman in t he white waistcoat . 37
Other than this mistreatment of the children , Dickens also denounced the Parish ' s
refusal to give relief outside its walls . In all, Dickens saw the workhouse as
"a conglomeration of church wardens and overs eers, the instigators and the perpetrators of a bad system. Here th human spirit is systematically ground and
punished into subjection .,, 38
Critical , then, of the State's cfforts to provide relief, Dickens turned
to the church, and on church charity , he vented the same a nger and f rustration .
The church, Dickens fe lt, was too concerned with people in other co untries instead of those at home who had the same needs . A poigna nt argum ent for this
idea was advanced in the character of Jo in Bleak House :
It must be a strange state to be like Jo! To shuffle through
the streets, unfamiliar with the shapes , and in utter darkness
as to the meaning of those mysterious symbols, so abundant over
the shops, and at the corners of the streets and on the doors,
and in the windows! . . . Jo . . . sits down to breakfast on
the door- step of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts, and gives it a brush when he has finis hed,
as an acknowledgement of the accomoda tion. He admires the size
of th e edifice, and wonders what it's all about . He has no idea,
poor wretch, of th spiritual desti tu tion of a coral reef in the
Pacific , or what it costs to l oo k up the precious souls among the
cocoa -nut s a nd bread fruit. 39

•
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At Jo's death, Dickens interjected himself into the book, saying "Dead, your
Hajesty. Dead, my 10rdR nnd I\entlemen . Dead, Ril\ht Reverends and wrong Reverends of every order . Dead, men and women, born with Heavenly compassion in
your hearts. And dying thus around us every day."40 The statement is a vicious
indictment o[ the church and the state who ignore the poverty and starvation
that surround them both.
Another social question that gripped Dickens' attention was drinking. He
quarrelled with his contemporaries who averred that drinking caused social evils.
Dickens disagreed, saying tha t poor people were no t "inherently evil, but they
are driven by their poverty to commit social crimes." He urged others to examine the causes of drinking instead:
Foul smells, disgusting habitations, bad workshops, and workshop
customs, want of light, air and water, the absence of all easy
means of decency and health are . . . its common, everyday physical causes. The mental wearine ss .::md languor so induced, the
want of wholesome relaxation, the craving for some stimulus and
excitement . . . and last, and inclusive of all the rest, ignorance . . . are its most obvious moral causes. 4l

Solve these problems, Dickens claimed, and the drinking problem would disappear.
As a cure for many social problems, Dickens sU$1;l\ested education, but when
he surveyed the kind of educa tion offered to children, he was disappointed. The
schools in Dickens' fiction illustrate what he considered as evils in educating
the young. In Nicholas Nickleby, Dickens described Dotheboys Hall as an "incipient Hell." Dr. Blimber's Academy in Dombey and Son was more respectable but
eDually as blighting since it taught a superficial layer of knowledge that allowed the teacher to show off the child and his amount of learning. Finally,
in Hard Times, the Gradgrind school demanded purely factual responses to questions. Dickens, in fact, titled the schoolroom scene in that book "Hurdering
the Innocents," because at Gradgrind' s school, ca tering to the lower classes,
an assembly line atmosphere prevailed. In each of these schools, teachers had
no recognition of a child's emotional and intellectual needs: it was this blindness to "Fancy," as Dickens called it, that he feared . 42
But while Dickens was concerned about all types of schooling, his greatest
reform efforts were directed toward the Ragged Schools. a movement initiated
by evangelicals to educate slum children. His interest in these schools dated
from 1843 when he visited Field Lane School. l""i1e he supported the Ragged
School endeavor , he did have cer tain misgivings. The schools were ill-equipped
and underfunded. He wrote to Hiss Coutts after his visit to one that he had
visited Ragged School and an awful sight it is .
The school
is held in thr(>e most wretched rooms on the first floor of a
rotten house. . . . T have very seldom seen, in all the strange
and dreadful things t have seen in London and elsewhere, anything
so shocking as the dire neglect of the so ul and body exhibited
in these children.
The children are travelling to their
graves. 43
Dickens praised the teachers, volunteers who gave their free time to teach, for
their "moral courage," especially in view of the "disheartening circumstances"
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of the school .
liTo

impr~ss

Also upset by the emphasis of religious instruction, he wrote,

them, even with the idea of a God , when th ir own condition is so

desolate, becomes a monstrous task . " Deciding , however, that the Ragged Schools
were better than nothing , "a slight and ineffec tua l palliative of an enormous
evil," he became a s upporter of th · m in Household Hords, encouraging people t o
visit Lhem and subscribe , a plea to which many favorably responded . 44 Hoping
for fur the r support , Dickens wrote an nrticle for the Daily News on Februa r y
4, 1846 in which he tried to explain the purposes of the schools :
. to introduce among t he most miserable and neglected out cas ts in London, some knowledge of the commonest principles of
morality and religion; to commence their recognition as immortal
creatur es before the Gaol Chaplain becomes their only schoolmaster; to suggest to Soc iety that its duty to this wretched
throng, foredoomed to crim and punishment , rifhtfully begins
at some distance from the police office . . . . 5
He valued these schools, chen as a preventive to juvenile crime and later social
misbehavior.
The Ragged School exp rience met with bitter opposition , but Dickens per severed, writing frequently about the schools in his Household Words and sendi ng
a continual flow of lett ers to the Daily News . Even though his last fictiona l
referenc t o the schools is an un comp limentary one , he co ntinued t o support
t hem as a prelude to more far reachin,,- ed uc;) tional a nd social reforms .
The Ragged Schools did not stand alone in Dickens ' condemnation . Because
of their inefficiency, charity schools , which among o ther complaints required
that their students wear uniforms, also became a Dickensonian target . Wearing
a uniform, Dickens believed, marked a child as a cha rit y case and thus isolated
him from other children. Tn Dombey and Son, Dickens crea t ed Robin, who, because
he wore a charity school uniform, was harassed by other children as he went back
and forth to school . 46 \4orkhouse schools were even worse in Dickens ' mind.
In Household \40rds , he described a visit to a workhouse school , saying tha t he
was "oppressed by the general air of lassistude and hopelessness, of stern dis cipline and poor feeding . " His gonl fo r these schools was to get them to teach
ind ustrial and farm trajnin g to the boys and domestic training to the gir ls. 47
lfuat was the solution to these ducational dilemmas that Dicke ns a nguished
ove r? While he did not favor a syst m t otally admini stered by the state, he
did want the sta t e to insur e that all chi ldren go t a minimum ed ucation . He
explained his attitude about reform in Household Hords:
To endow such Institutions and leave the question of National
Education in its present shameful s tate would be to maintain
a crue l absurdity to which we a r e most strongly opposed. The
compulsory industrial education of neglected children and the
severe punishment of neglectful and unnatural parents are reforms to which we must come .
14e can no more hope to make
any g reat impressions upon crime, without these changes , than

we could hope to stop the eruption of Ht . Vesuvius with a watering pot or stop its flow with a knitting needl e . 48

•
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Even though Charles Dickens W8S aware of many social injustices existing
in England, he never lost his faith in his country . While he was on his American
trip in 1842 , he wrote a letter pI dging , "I lov" England better than I did when
I left her, " and in .::another lette r, he said, " . . . T have

.1

yearning after our

English Cus t oms a nd English manners, s uch as you cannot conceive . "49 \~hat he
tried to do, th e n, in his novels a nd other writings was not destroy the system ,
bu t to bring about r eforms , believing that man could improve himself . \,JlJile
he could no t be classified as a practical reformer , he can be credited with
exposi ng a huge audience to social problems that they had previously ignored.
Some of his con temporaries cri ti cized his approach to social reform. For example, Thomas Carlyle scorned Dickens, taunting that his " solution to social and
political wrongs was t o dress up as Father Christmas and dole out enormous turkeys to impoverished victims of laissez- faire capitalism ." SO But, maybe the
practicality of his solutions is not what is really important .

"Ah, sir," said

a cabby s hortl y after Dickens ' death, " Mr. Dickens was th e gentlema n who looked
after the poo r man . "Sl And , in looking after the poo r man, Dickens became the
outspoken advocate of the individual trapped by a sys t em that ignored, ev en
trampled, him , a system that caused the early death of the Stephen Blackpools
who called life "a muddle" and who had to die to find "the God of t he poor ."S 2
The dark an d bleak world of Dickens ' novels portrayed the kind of society he
thought Eng l and had become . That grim, sordid world both outraged and bewildered him , but it did not dim his haunting vision of a more humane world where
the cries of the Dlivers, the Jos , the Stephens, and the Davids would no longer
go unheeded .
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TO HELL WITH HABEAUS CORPUS
A uniqu e experience occurred in American history beginning on March 24,
1942 with the removal and later incarceration of over 80,000 Japanese- American
citizens . Never befor e had the President of the United States , by Executive
Order, allowed the civil liberties of a minority group of citizens to be violated in this manner . These people were not inJividually accused of a crime
and were not afforded th e constitutional guarantee of a trial. They were interned as a gro up because of a myriad of complex reasons compounded by events
beginning with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Since World War II historians have agreed that the agitating forces for
this mass resettlement were the military, politicians, and pressure groups.
The primary motivations were fear, greed, and racism . In order to understand
the magnitude of the decision, an exami nation of historical literature over
the past fifteen years shows that it is impossible to conclude that anyone,
or even two, of these groups could have accomplished such a feat . It took all
of them working in concert to produce Executive Order 9066 and the resulting
internment of so many American citizens.
Fear, racism, and greed on the part of pressure g roups prompted politicians
to demand action from the military, a nd the military, with its own concern over
the protection of the West Coast military installations and fear of invasion ,
completed the circle by instilling fear in the pressure groups . These pressure
groups fall roughly into three categories : racist, economic , and patriotic .
The most powerful spokesman for the patriots was the American Legion . Economic
groups representing anti - Japanese sentiments were the Grower- Shipper Vegetable
Associations of Central California, the Western Growers and Shippers, the Cali fornia Farm Bureau Federation, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the
Los Angeles Merchants and Manufacturers . The r acist element voiced many of
its cries through the Native Sons of the Golden ',est and the California Joint
Immigration Committee.
The Yellow Peril attitude of the racists toward the Chinese was transferred
to the Japanese immigrants as early as 1900. Even though there were only 24,326
Japanese in the entire United States, they were pictured by the West Coast States
as hordes of coolies . They were viewed as tricky, unreliable, and dishonest
people who were taking jobs from White Americans. Anti- Japanese propaganda increased during the Russo- Japanese War and by June , 1905 the anti-Japanese forces
consolidated into the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League . Many of the League
members and officials also belonged to the Native Sons of The Golden West, an
organization dedicated to excl usi on or Orientals. l
By 1920 aliens were forbidden to lease land, to purchase stock in any organization which owned or leased agricultural land, and they were no longer allowed
to purchase land in the name of their citizen children . By 1923 this land law
was extended to prohibit Japanese aliens from sharecropping . Shortly before
the Immigration Act of 1924 another orga nization was formed which consisted of,
among others, the Grand President of the Native Sons of The Golden West , Mr.
V.S. MCClatchy. McClatchy was also editor and owner of the racist newspaper,
Mary B. McCracken
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t he Sac ramento Bee .

This new orga nizat ion , the California Joi nt Immigration

Committee, became by 1927 the most power f ul single r acist group in California.
Th i s nativist organization made sure that exclusion a ga inst the Japanes e was
r e ta ined . . When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, thes e anti-Japanese forces
of the West Coa st began to talk in terms of non- assimilation and the " unAmericanism" of dual citizens hip . 2 After Pea rl Harbor the xenophobia of many
white Calif ornians shar ed the Immigration Committ e e ' s view that the Japanese
problem was now a national one and , like the Na tive Sons, decided it was time
to ge t done what should have been a ccompli s h ed a quarter of a century ago . 3
The sur prise a tta ck on Pearl Harbor gave credence to racist groups ' vi ews
that the Japanese were a sneaky, diabolical race of people. This was quickly
becomin g the West Coast ' s op ini on in December of 1941 where over 117,000 Japanese
lived in wha t would later be termed as military areas. Because of physical
appearance and cultural differences, the alien and Japanese- American citizens
were thought of as a mass group a nd no t as individuals . The immigrant alien
Issei, the Japa nese educa t ed Kibei, and the American born Nisei were considered
s t ill l oyal to the Emperor . They would fi ght for their country either in front
of o r behind e nemy lines . 4 Associate Supreme Court Ju s ti ce Owen J . Rober t s,
Chai rman of President Roosevelt ' s special investi gating commissio n on the ca use
of t he disaster a t Pea rl Harbor, indicated that th e attack was pla nned well
befor e Japan broke diplomatic relations with the Unit ed States and was aided
by f ifth column activities in Hawaii . 5 The Rober ts Report added impe t us t o
West Coast pressure g roups wh o insisted it was impossible to d i stinguish between loyal a nd di sloyal Japanese .

The questi on o f loyalty i nt ensified in mi d- Feb ruar y of 1942 as the allie s'
mi litary situation con t inued to deteriorate in the Pacific .
Japan . . . had ta ken most of the Phillipines , Hong Kong,
Thailand, Wake and Guam Isla nd s , Surawak, Tarakan , and o t her
sections of Borneo, Moulmein in Burma, outlying Du t ch and
Australia n po sse ssions , and the Malay Peninsula up to
Singapor e Is l and - and Singapore was to surrender on the
fifteenth of February.6
Losses in the Pacific coincided with several s trong anti - Japa nese press releas es.
On Feb ruary 5, 1942 th e House on Un-American Activities , or the Dies Commi t tee,
released its "YellmoJ Paper" revealing West Coast f ifth column activi ty. Walter
Lip pman , on February 12, wrot e D syndicated column t itled "The Fif t h Column on
the Coast. " His opinion was that since there was no important sabo t age as yet
on the Coast, that such activities we re being held back for one tremendous
attac k. As a result of the gravity of the si tua tion, Lippman advoca t ed se t ting aside the ci vil rights of Japanese- American ci t izens . Four days la t er
Easte rn columnist \1es t brook Pegler, a conservative ri ght- wing jo urnalis t , wrote
that all Japanese in California should be under armed g uard a nd " to he l l wi th
habeaus corpus . " 7
Racism , fed by war hys t eria , soo n began to have i t s affect on eco nomic
specia l interest gr oups . The whole sale prod uce markets in Los Angeles wan t ed
to eliminate their Japanese competitors. II Whi t e American" nur se rymen or ganized
a boycott of Japanese firms . 8 The Grower - Shipper Associa tion , wh ich was almost
a subsidiary of the lar ge r Wes t ern Gr owers, publis hed a br ochure en t i tl ed NO
J APS NEEDED to assure Californians they would not go hungr y wi t hout t he Japa nese
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truck farmers. This Ifhite growers association leased lands which produced fresh
vegetables the year around in Salinas , Imperial and Salt River Valleys for Eastern markets, as did the Japanese . The Salinas Valley alone produced half of
the head lettuce sold in the country ' s produce markets. 9
The extent to which the Japanese were cutting into White farmers and
laborers was examined in a series of hearings by Congressman John H. Tolan
and the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration in the West
Coast Area. According to the Tolan Committee Report, Japanese farming occupied
43 percent of the gainfully employed in the th r ee Pacific States and 24 percent
were engaged in wholesale and retail trades.lO In 1941 California-Japanese
farmers grew 42 percent of the State acreage in commercial truck crops which
was valued at approximately $100,000,000 for both the fresh market and pro cessing . The Japanese operated 3 . 9 percent of all farms in the State. They
harvested only 2.7 percent of all cropland, but as laborers and owners they
produced :
Ninety percent or more of the following crops: snapbeans for
marketing; cele ry , spring and summer; peppers; strawberries.
Fifty to ninety percent of the following: artichokes; snapbeans for canning; cauliflower; celery, fall and winter; cucumbers; fall peas; spinach; tomatoes. Twenty - five to fifty
percent of the following : asparagus, cabbage, cantaloupes,
carrots, lettuce, onions, and watermelons . ll
It is significant to note that these percentages represent in monetary
value between 30 and 35 percent of all commercial truck crops grown in
California . 12 Considering the monetary value of the Japanese commercial
truck crops, it is important to relate this to the location of the farms
in California and t he economic pressure groups "ho demanded Japanese relocation.
Nearly 30 percent of all commercial truck farms were located in Los Ang p les County, while almost 85 percent were in Alameda, Fresno, Imperial, Monterey,
Orange, Peaser, Sacramento, San Diego, San Joaquin, Santa Clara and Tulare. 1 3
It was from these counties that much of the anti-Japanese agitation arose.
1·lith the outbreak of the war, the California State Farm Bureau appointed a
committee to investigate the Japanese problem . Following the investigation,
the Bureau recommended that all alien and citizen Japanese be put under fed e ral supervision . In February the Los Angeles County directors of the Farm
Bureau unanimously passed a resolution stating that all alien and citizen
Japanese be confined to concentration camps jn the interest of national defense. 14 The loss of Japanese agricultural products was not a factor to many.
Representing the agriculturists in Monterey County, H.L. Strobel told the
Tolan Committee :
I believe that the American farmers, or the farmers of California,
are entirely capable, and with the land now occupied by Japanese,
will produce in just as large a quantity the vegetables that
have been formerly produced by the Japanese in our farming
areas. 15
The California Chambers of Commerce concurred with the California Farm
Bureau. The California Chambers of Commerce through its Agricultural Committee
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recommended on De cember 22 , 1941 that al l Ja pa ne se nati onals be pu t under fed eral control .

In February th e Los Angeles chapter as a gro up went o n record

as ad voca tin g the remov al of all Japanese to an a r ea some fif ty miles from th e
Coast and the Mexi can border . 16 Removal of the Ja pan ese would be advantageous
no t only t o th e Hhi t e farme r but also to th e wh olesale and r e tail business in
Los Angeles . The largest metropolitan produce dist ributing cent er west of
Chicago was located in Los Angeles and controlled by a Ja pa nese syndicate . 17
The California a ttitud e towar d t his situation and th e Japanese fa rme r is best
described in the Tolan Commit tee hearing by a repres entative of th e Associa ted
Produce Deal ers and Brokers of Los Angeles :
I have talked to ma ny wholesale grower s of vegetables
for the local market who have either gone out of business in
the past t e n yea r s or gr ea tl y r educed th ei r operations due
to Japanese competition .
A compr ehensive system of associat ion s se t up for these

s mal l Japanese farmers has enabled them to regulate market
s upplie s a nd reduce p ri ces at will , to the poi nt the Hhite
growe r has been fo rced out of product i o n . However, th e re
i s a vast reserve of s killed \.Jhite f armers who will resume

the pr oduction of vege t a bl es wh e never they ha ve any idea
tha t it can be do ne withou t goi ng up a gainst this t ype of
Japanese competition . . . . 18
An a nalysis of what the Japa ne se lost mone tarily as a result of evacuation
shows "hat the economic groups had t o ga in from Japanese relocation . According
to H. R. A. Chief of Evacue e Property, Mr . Russell Robinson, th e Japanese left
some $ 200,000 , 000 worth of rea l , pe rs o nal a nd commercial prop e rt y . Many lea sehold ing fa rm evacuees lost thes e l ease s to other races. In 1945 Japan ese farm
owne rshi p was about 30 percent of their t otal pre- war fa rm operati ons . \{hat
rema ined fo r the tota l pre- war Japanese l andh olde rs and leaseholders was a bout
60,000 acres or less th an 0 . 002 of all fa rms in the Hest Coast States . 19 This
is mo re than a considerab le loss of ac reage .

The pr e - war land acreage in Cali -

fo rnia , Has hing ton, a nd Or egon was 258 . 0 74 acres . 20 In o rder for the \.)es t
Coas t eco nomic g roups t o a ssume Japanese land and other ho ldings , which could
only be accomplish ed by their evac uation, it was necessary t o put pressure on

their pol iticians.
The f irst official body to make is s ue of th e alien and Japanese American
c itizen was the Ca li fo rn ia legisla tu re . On Ja nuary 17 , 1942 the Senate passed
two resolutions : o ne called for an inve s ti ga tion of the California Alien Land
Law a nd th e seco nd fo r the creation of an investiga ting commi ttee to s tudy em-

ployment of Japanese-American ci t izens by the State . The first resolution
argued that t he l<lh ite and Ori e ntal races were socially and economical l y incompatible. It also poi nted out th a t aliens we r e in control of lar ge land areas
nea r vital i nstallations whi ch c reat ed a menace to national defense, citizens
of the State, nation, a nd th e American v egetable a nd fr uit g rower a nd dealer.

The second r esolution wa s to prev ent em ployment of anyone who proved disloyal
t o the United States . This mea sur e was directed a t worke r s who possessed dua l
c itiz e nship- - in other words , tl1e Ja pane se . 2l

The f irst resolution concerning the Ali e n Land Law is not d i ffic u l t to
understand considering t he pre ssure from racists and eco nomi c g r o ups .

However,

•
•
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the second resolution concerning employm~nt of the disloyal is more complex.
The situation that many politicians found themselves in can perhaps best be
seen through California Attorney General Earl Warren's statement a few weeks
after Pearl Harbor. He said, "The Japanese situation . . . may well be the
Achilles' heel of the entire civilian defense effort."22 On February 2,
Warren told a conference of Sheriffs and district attorneys that the lack
of fifth column activity and sabotage made it appear that the Japanese were
waiting until "the zero hour arrived. " Z3

However, on February 7, \.Jarren wrote

Assemblyman Thomas A. Maloney concerning the legality of the state Personnel
Bonrd barring from Civil Service examina tions anyone 'vho descended from nationals of countries with which the United States was at war. \,]arren stated
the refusal to accept these people was discriminatory and a violation of civil
liberties . 24 But 1942 was an election year for many politicians and for Earl
Warren a governorship was pendi ng .
\,arren did not have a real state political machine, so sheriffs end district attorneys of California were his r eal political base. 25 During the
February conference, \'arren was able to feel out his own constituents and to
get the temper of Californians at the local level. Two weeks later when he
testified before the Tolan Committee, "arren was less concerned with civil
liberties and more concerned with sabotage, espionage, the inability to determine the loyal from the disloyal Japanese, and the possibility of vigilante
action .
At the San Francisco Tolan Committee hearings, Warren testified :
Thr oughout the Santa Maria Valley and including the cities
of Santa ~~ria and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge,
telephone, and power line or other facility of importance, is
flanked by Japanese, and even surround the oil fields in this
area . . . law enforcement officers do not know which of these
Japanese are American citizens and which are aliens. 26
As part of his prepared statement, Warren read before the Committee a communication from C. B. Harrall, Chief of Police of Los Angeles, on the question of loyalty:
After thorough and complete investigation of the relationship
existing between parents and children , and the tendencies of
the American-born Japanese, 1 feel that they present as difficult, if not more difficult, problem than the enemy alien . 27
\vanen also commen t ed on the possibility of vigi lante action :
there are many, many Japanese who are now roaming a r ound
the \vestern States in a condition that will unquestionably
bring about race riots and prejudice and hysteria and excesses
of all kinds . 28

All of the groups represented at the Tolan Committee hearings who expressed
these same fears as Warren believed that complete evacuation was necessary for
the protection of the Japanese and because it was a military necessity.29
During the second week in January, public pressure began to react a t a higher
level .
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Congressman Lela nd Fo rd of Los Angeles became the first politician on the
national level to become involved in t he Japa ne se question. After receiving a
letter f rom a prominent, though not named , Hol l ywood actor sugges tin g legisla tion to remove all Japanese truck farmers f r om the California coastline inland,
Ford wr ote Se cretar y of State Cordell Hull and seven o ther executive o fficials
that he agree d with t he proposal . He was informed by Attorney Gen e ral Francis
Biddle that this was not possible unless th e writ of habea us co rpus was s uspended . Ford th en suggested th e Army and Navy be given the a uthority to remove
a ll person s who might be harmful t o the safe t y a nd wel fare of the coun try from
s tr a tegic areas . By February 9, Fo rd was advocating mass internment. 30
Until February 2 , 1942 , the West Coast co ngressmen like For d were acting
on t he Japanese problem alone . On J a nuary 30 , 1942 , a t a Los Angeles Ch amber
of Conune r ce meeting several \.Jest Coast con gressmen \.Jere i nvi ted to hear addre ss -

es given by Charl es Nardoff , co - a ut hor of Mutiny On the Bounty, and Ca p tain
Lowell Li mpus , a newsp ape r columnist . Bo th speakers ur ged for evacuation o f
al l Japanese . Th e result of this mee ting was th e Costello Resolution which
was presented before a congress ional ca uc us asking the \.Jar Department to have

immediate and complet e char ge ove r all al ien enemies and those holdin g dual
cit iz e nship . It also cal l ed for mass evacuation of al l e nemy aliens and their
families. Those people holding dual c itizenshi p wo ul d be given the opportunity
a nd fede ral assis t a nc e for voluntary res e ttl ement . 31
Three days later t he enti re \, est Coas t Congr essiona l Delegation met . Sena t or Hiram Jo hnson appoi nt ed two committ ees fr om the I,est Coast delegation .
Senator Ruf us C. Holman of Oregon headed the commi tt ee for defense of the West
Co ast, a nd Sena t or C. H I l gren of I,ashing ton was head of the commit t ee dealing
with enemy a liens and sabotage con tr ol of the I,est Coas t. Senator Hallgren ' s
c ommit t ee eliminated th e question of citizenship and based its decision on
loya lt y alone . It recommended using the a utho rity of the Army for partia l or
comple t e evac ua ti on of s trategic ar eas which wo uld be determined by the mili tary . Senator Holman ' s committee recommended t he immed i a te evacua t ion of al l
persons of Japanese lineage and all o th e rs , al i ens and citizens , considered
danger ous from s tr a t egic areas . This committee considered the entire states
of Cali fornia , Orego n, Hashington , and Alaska a s strategic areas . These recomme ndati ons date d Februa ry 13, 1942 were se nt t o President Roosevel t. 32
There were ma ny interrelating factors that ca us ed th e I,e st Coast co ngressmen t o make such strong recommendations to t he Pr esiden t of th e United States .
As already indicated , pressure groups motivated by fear, racism , and gr eed ,
wer e increasingl y pe rsi s t ent . Local officials a nd pol i t ical figures through
sincer e concern and the desire t o pacify their constituents pressed fo r a solution t o t he Japanese problem. The news merlia fanned t he emo t ional spark of
fea r i n t o a r ag ing flame . The war in the Pacific was go ing badly for the Allies .
Wes t Coast Ameri cans were r apidly losing confidence in t he Federal Burea u of
Investiga ti on a nd the Department of Justice to ha ndl e the Japanese pr oblem.
To satisfy these peopl e there was onlv one recourse-- to decla r e th e Japa nese
problem a military ne cess ity . On Feb ruary 19 , 1942 , Roosevelt issued Exec utive Order No . 9066 whi ch gave the Secre tar y of I,ar and th ose military command ers he mig ht designate t he right t o declare any a rea they deemed necessa r y as
strategic and remove a ny pe r so n therein . 33 Secretary of Har St imso n assigned
the \.Jes tern Defens e Comma nder , General John L . Dewitt , t o carry out the Exec urive Order .
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General Del'itt was affected by the agitatinl\ groups in their demand for
the removal of all Japanese from the West Coast and, in his desire to protect
the West Coast area, he also had an affect on the agitating groups . The two
common elements the agitating groups shared with the West Coast military were
racism and the geographic concentration of the Japanese.
As early as January 29, 1942, DeWitt agreed with Admiral Truma, head of
Lhc West Coast Naval Defense, that all aliens and Japanese-American citizens
should be removed from Bainbridge Island because of the shipbuilding plant
Lhere. 34 Concerning this issue, DeWitt reported to General Provost Marshal
Gullion the same day: " . . . but you know there is one group and a large
g roup want to move them entirely out of the State, another group want s to
move them to the Middle I~est . . . . ,,35 This "large group" which was secretly
organizing as a special interest group to force federal action was the West
Coast congressmen . 36 These congressmen and coastal political leaders aided
the military geographic argument. The previously- cited statement by I~arren
to the Tolan Committee on February 21, 1942 is almost identically worded in
DeWitt's June 5, 1943 "Final Report" to the I~ar Department on the Japanese
evacuation . Del~itt then stated:
Throughout the Santa Maria Valley and including the cities of
Santa ~~ria and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge ,
telephone, and power lin or other facility of importance
is flanked by Japanese.
37
The geographi c concent ratio n of Japanese aliens and citizens bred concern
in Lhe military when coupled with the [ear of sabotage and possible invasion
of the I~est Coast. Be t ween December 20 Lo December 23, 1941, Japanese submarines fired on three American tankers and one freighter, sinking the tanker
Emidis. On January 25, 1942, enemy submarines were again sighted off the Pa cific coast. 38 These events tended to support Del~itt's December 11, 1941 announcement that there were 34 Japanese ships between San Francisco and Los
Angeles; also, the December 13 rumor that the main Japanese fleet was 164 miles
off San Francisco . However, DeWitt's reports were never documented . 39
DeWitt was convinced that an invasion was imminent and the 20 ,000 Japanese
the San Francisco Bay area would rise to support Japan . On December 19 , 1941,
passed these concer ns to Washlngton and recommended that all enemy aliens
interned. This proposal for all enemy aliens was never acted upon because
obvious political reasons. There were approxima t ely 700,000 Italian and
300,000 German aliens in the Hest Coast area . 40 As late as Ja nuary 31, 1942,
DeWitt was still pushing for evacuation of all enemy aliens on the West Coast
35 a preventive action against sabotage; only, by this date he includ ed JapaneseAmerican citizens as well. 1
in
he
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On February 3, 1942, Del<itt talked to Chief of Staff General George C.
After a conference with the Governor of California and several representatives from the Departments of Justice and Agriculture, DeWitt told
Marshall that the people of Cali fornia were very disturbed over the aliens and
w.1nted lo get them out of several communities . DeWitt indicated his only concern was the protection of military installations . The same day Assistant
Secretary of I~ar John McClov admonished DeWi t t not to discuss wholesale evacuntion of Japanese citizens and aliens with political figures. DeWitt then
told ~fcCloy of his telephone conversation ,dth General Marshall in which Marshall
~~rshall.
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concurred in a dvoca ting removal of Japanese aliens from areas i n Califo rnia
whi ch were considered combat zones. Acco rding to DeWitt this movement would
be accomplished with th e aid of Cali fo rnia Governor Culbert L. 01so n. 42
Five days pri or t o these t\W conversations with the IJa r Department, the
Attorney General, on DeWitt ' s recomme nda ti on, began designating prohibited zones
co ntaining vi tal installations . l,ith in a few d,a ys th e r e were 99 s uch zones
whi ch were off limits t o all a li ens of enemy nationality . The largest of these
zo ne s were the waterfronts of San Fra nc isco , San Diego, Wilmington , and Terminal
Island. Aside from these military a reas th e re was a lar ge portion of Los Angeles
City and County, amounting to a 40 sq uare mile area whic h was also now classif ied as a pr ohibited area . 43 After the Attorn ey General ' s action, it seems
reasonable that the military and those West Coast peo ple who so greatly feared
invasion, esp i onage, and sabotage would be pacified ; however, this was no t a
reasonable time . By th e second week in Febr uar y all groups advocating the remova l of enemy aliens and Japa nes e-Ameri ca n citizens intensified their actions

on both the War Departmen t and the Justice Department .
Bowi ng t o pressure, Attorney Genera l Bi ddle established 135 separate areas
in Calif o rnia , Orego n, l,ashington, and Arizona as prohibited areas t o a ll enemy
a li ens by February 15. He a lso declared a curfew for reconstructed a r eas for
all enemy aliens and placed travel restri c tions of fiv e miles from their homes. 44
The se actions did not please West Coas t economi~ groups, politiCians, o r the
military . California farmers did no t want more Japa nese moving in t o their lands
a nd c ited sabotage and fear of vigilantism as their r easons . 45 Wes t Coast politicians were not eager t o disrupt the la r ge number of Ge rman and Italian a lie ns .
The military wa s concerned over Biddle ' s lack of total exclusion from mos t of
the West Coast air cr aft factories. Biddle woul d not acquiesce because he held
to the premise tha t his Departme nt did not ha ve the constitutional right to go
fu rther . 46
Once Biddle refused to exceed his autho rity as Attorney General of the
United States other means had to be found to remove those who were th e cause
of West Coast fea r , ra cism, and gr eed- -the Japanese- American ci ti zen . On
December 11, 1941, Chief of Staff General George C. Ma r shall declared the West
Coast and Alaska a " Theater of Opera t ions." Biddle wrote to Secretary of Wa r
Stimson on Feb ruar y 12, 1942 , tha t th e evacua t ion of Ja pa nese citizens would
have t o be based on military considerations whi ch was the responsibility of
the Army, not t he Justice Depa rtment . 4 7 Unknowingly , both Marshall and Biddle
se t the ac t i on for the final tr avesty . Two days before Biddle ' s le tt er t o
Stimson, Tom Clark from the Justic e Depar tment, Los An ge les Mayor Fletcher
Bowr an , Cali fornia Attorney General Warren , and Ge nera l DeWit t met to settle
the Japane se problem . They concluded i t was a mili t ary, not civilian , pr oblem .
The West Coast Congressional Del ega tion, on Februa r y 13 , presse d the President
fo r t he Evacua t ion of all persons of Japanese descent . Del,i tt, as Comma ndi ng
Gene ral of the Western Defense Command, forwarded to Secretary of War Stimson
on February 14, his final recommendation on the subject of " Evac ua t ion of
Japanese and Other Subversive Persons From the Pacific Coast.,,48
DelJitt ' s final recomme ndation exp l ains the military fears of J apanes e a ttack , sabotage , and espionage . It a lso expresses the same racial ha tr ed of
the Japanese that was exhibited by the nativists , the e conomic pr essure groups,
a nd the politicia ns :

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

34

The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and
third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed
of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized ,' the
racial strains are undiluted.
It, therefore, follows that
along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies
of Japanese extraction are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and ready for concerted action
at a favorable opportunity . The very fact that no sabotage
has taken place to date is a disturbin~ and confirming indication that such action will be taken. 9
Del~it t urged exclusion of Japanese aliens, Japanese-Amer ican citizens, other
enemy aliens, and any other suspect subversives from military areas decided
upon at his discretion. At this point DeWitt advised internment for all aliens
and subversives. The Japanese-American citizen had the opportunity to accept
volun tary internment. 50

At the time of Delo/itt' s final recommendation , the President was also being
urged by Secretary of War Stimson, the West Coast Delegation, West Coast officials and organizations, the press, and the radio to make a decision on the
Japanese problem. This was a critical time for Roosevel t. The war had to be
won . It was imperative to keep unity at home to win the peace or become another
I~oodrow IHlson.
And he had to keep his m'O political party intact. l-lith these
three objectives in mind, Roosevelt chose not to avoid the Japanese problem,
but responded in a manner in which he excelled--by playing "broker politics."
In signing Executive Order No. 9066, Roosevelt authorized the Secretary of War
to choose the military commanders who would, at their discretion, determine
which areas would be considered military and any persons who would be excluded
(rom these areas. The Secretary of Ivar or the military commanders would provide "such transportation, food shelter , and other accommodations as may be
necessary ."S1
The Secretary of \var designated Ivestern Defense Commander John DeHitt to
implement Executive Order No. 9066. From this moment the fate of some 80,000
Japanese-American citizens was determined. The removal and eventual internment
of American citizens was now legal through Presidential proclamation and by
military necessity. Agitation from the racists, pressure groups, and the military succeeded in placing any American citizen under the complete control of
the military during war-time. This small, politically powerless group of Ivest
Coast Japanese-American citizens were the victims of racism, greed , and fear
emanating from the racists, pressure groups, and the military.
In examining the three agitating groups responsible for the JapaneseAmerican evacuation during Horld l.Jar II, it may be concluded that no single,
or even two, groups of anti-Japanese could have succeeded in a feat of this
magni tud e . In order for this violation of civil liberties to take place, it
is necessary to cite these combined forces: the waning course of the war in
the Pacific with the steadily increasing pressure from the agitating groups.
The deteriorating condition in the South Pacific, the agitation of the racists,
pressure groups , and the military working In concert , produced the attitude
assumed by many on the h'est Coast--to hell with habeaus corpus.
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TITUS OATES :
AUTHOR OF THE POP I SH PLOT
lihen violence and factions are the ord er of the day , and a co urt system
prevails whi ch gi ves credence t o rumo r a nd hearsay , plotting and the discovery
of plots naturally become the major occupations o f the time . Such was the
situation in England during the fall of 1678 . The populace was general l y suspicious and distrustful of the restored mo narch Charles II . The rise of arbi trary governmen t seemed manifes ted in the actions of Thomas Osbo rne , Earl o f
Danby, Charles ' Lord Treasurer. Also , t he fea r o f popery was intensified by
the presence of James, Duke of York, a Catholic co nv e rt, brother to Cha rles
a nd s uccessor to the t hr one . lihen Danby a nd James joi ned forces in their political policies , the a tmosphere became even tenser. This sit uation laid t he
groundwo rk for one of the mos t astute informers of t he time , Ti t us Oates . l
Though Titus Oates was und oubtedly a " l yin g madman , " his fabricated t a le
of a fie ndish Popis h Plot made him a national hero and resulted in t he execution of numerous innocent people. His backg r ound of pe r j ury should have been
sufficient to invalidate his statements; however , the prevail in g popular f eeling of animosi ty toward Papis ts and th e political situat ion insure d his s uccess
as an informer . CharIest reluctance co di scount Oates' testimony e vidences the
pO\ver of popula r sentiment duri ng this pe riod . Even af ter the King successfully
ca ugh t Oates in severa l obvio us lies rela ting t o the s upposed plo t , he coul d
not overlook the accusa t io ns for fear of bei ng accused of Catholi c sympa thy .
Oates ' initial s uccess may be attributed t o pop ular sentiment, but his con t i nued succes s wa s relat ed more closely t o t he poli t ical use mad e of his plo t. 2
Although Oates re cei ve d somp meas ur e of pop ularit y in 1678 , he had not
been wel l rece i ved in the pas t. He was an ex tr emely unattractive per son as
evidenced by a description of hi s be in g " squat , bull- ne c ked, bow- legged , and
wi t h a jaw s o enormous that his mouth appeared t o be hid eously in the middle
of his fact .,,3 His gro tes que appearance was eq ual l ed by his unsavory backgr o und. Born i n 1649 , Ti tus inher ited he t erodox leanings f rom his father Samuel
Oates , an active Anaba p tist during the Interregnum and late r the rector of a
church in Hastings af t e r the Restoration. Both l,Tes t minster School and Cambr i dge
expelled Titus from their pr emises after o nly a shor t time in r esidence. Tho ugh
he never mastered Latin, he took holy o rd ers after leaving Cambridge and r ece i ved
a c uracy i n Surrey a nd later a vicarage i n Kent in 1673 . Oates was forced to
leave Ken t on a charge of dr unkenness . Shortly ther eaf ter the Privy Co uncil
cha r ged him wi th perj ury f o r fals ely acc using a young boy of sodomy a nd t he boy ' s
fa ther of tr easonab le r ema rks . 4
Deeming it profitable t o remove himself for a time , Oa t es signed on as
chaplain for a f r i gate bo und fo r Tangier in May 1675 . On i t s r et urn, Oa t es
was dismissed fo r homosexual practices . This s omewhat explai ne d his mys t erious exp uls i ons from previous positions . In 1677, he served fo r th ree mo nth s
as chaplain to th e Pro t estan t memb e r s of the Earl of Nor wich ' s London household
before being dismissed . Immediately th e rea fte r he entered th e Roman Ca t hol i c
Church , a conversion he la t er insisted wa s insincere. I n spite of t he pa tronage
of Richard Strange , the English Pr ovincial of the Soc iety o f Jesus , he fai l ed
Sha ryon Sha rtzer
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again . His grotesque appearance, age, proven homosexuality, and ignorance of
Latin were not conducive to success in the Spanish, french or English Jesuit
schools to which he was sent . finally, in June 1678 Thomas ~~itbread, who
replaced Strange as Provincial, expelled Oates once again. S

Angered at the rejection by the Jesuits. Oates decided to use to his advantage the knowledge he had acquired during his brief association with them
in fabricating a Popish Plot which could reinstate him in the good graces of
his alternate faith. It was at this point that he renewed an earlier association with Dr. Israel Tonge, a Church of England rector who had for many years
tried to discover an actual popish plot against the throne. By convincing Tonge
that he had been hired by the Jesuits to poison him because of his translation
of a book entitled The Jesuits' Morals, Oates established a staunch ally in
the person of Tonge . Relying on his recent association with the Jesuits, Oates,
with the aid of Tonge, drew up a set of forty-three articles outlining an alleged papist conspiracy against England and King Charles II . The number eventually grew to eighty-one . The plot invented was less than original. It was
similar to earlier stories such as the Habernfeld Plot and Prynne's interpretation of the Civil loIar, but was redesi~ned to fit the time of Oates . 6
In short, the plot was structured as follows. The Pope was the leader of
the conspiracy and had commissioned the Society of the Jesuits to carry out
his plan to punish England and its sovereign for denouncing the true faith.
The King was to be either stabbed by Irish ruffians, shot by Jesuits, or poisoned by Sir George 1oIakeman, the Queen's physician, and Edward Coleman , Secretary to the Duchess of York. Oates claimed knowledge of specific amounts
paid for these services. In addition, the Catholics in London were to carry
out a general murder of all Protestants in England. With the disposal of
Charles, the Pope planned to offer the crown to James , Duke of York, who was
to follow the commands of the Pope or be replac ed by someone who would. Other
bedlam revealed by the Articles included the destruction of English commerce,
a french invasion of Ireland, and Jesuits disguised as Presbyterians were to
stir up revolt in Scotland. Other major figures implicated besides the Pope
were the King of france; the General of the Jesuits; Jesuit Provincials in
England , Spain, and Ireland; and Archbishops and Rectors of Jesuit colleges. 7
Using Tonge as his agent, Oates began his path to the King and Parliament.
Since Tonge had no way of directly contactin~ the King, he used an acquaintance,
Chr i s topher Kirkby, as a go-between. Kirkby, who was in some way employed as
a chemist by the court, knew the schedule of the King and contacted him on
August 13, 1678. As supposed plots were a common occurrence, the King paid
little notice and referred Kirkby to his secretary, 1o/illiam Chiffinch. Refusing to be dismissed, Kirkby took Tonge directly to the King later that same
day, at which time th ey were referred to Lord Treasurer Danby . This meeting
with Danby was perhaps the first stroke of luck for Oates since Danby decided
to make use of the situation. Danby agreed to further investigation of the
plot because he hoped to improve his sta nding with Parliament and felt that
a possible conspiracy might persuade them to appropriate money and arms for
protection at the next session. Thus far Parliament had refused to concede
to Danby and the King in this request for fear that a standing army might make
them strong enough to rule without their aid. Also, James joined with Danby
in support of the investigation hopin g to expose the allegations as false and
thereby exonerate his fellow Roman Catholics . S James had no fear of implication since Oates' story was designed for Anglicans a nd the court and against
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Dissen ters. Oates later went so far as t o give positive testimony that James
was not a par ty t o the conspiracy . 9
On September 28th Oates had his first chance to ga in fame as an informer .
The Privy Council, presided ove r by the King, bega n inves ti ga tin ~ t he matter.
Letters to James ' Jesuit co n fesso r Father Bedingf ield, whom Tonge had suggested
would substantiate his claim, were pronounced fo r geries; Tonge was called befo r the Council and announced that all he knew had come from Oates . Oates
was called to appear be fore th afternoon session, from which the King was
absent . Immediately he identified th e letters as t o specific authors and pro ceeded to give detailed dimensions to his ea rlier o ut lined plot . He claimed
to have secured this first-h and knowledge while living amo ng the Jesuits for
the sole purpose of spying on them. His quick answers and the minute detail
offered g reatly impressed the Council . Oates became so fi rmly establi shed in
the confidence of t he Council that the King was unable to prove him a perjurer
even after pr oving him false in some of his detailed description on the following day. Tha t day the Council ordered the ar rest of Coleman, the first of many
arrests based on the fabrications of Oates . A third day of testimony was given
in which Oates inc reas ed his charges to include:
. . . twenty- fo ur English Jesuits, nineteen foreign Jesuits,
twelve Scottish Jesuits, nine Benedictines , three Carmelites,
two Franciscans, nine Dominicans, fourteen se cular priests,
four secular persons , four Irish ruffians, and two archbishops . lO
By October 5th th e plot was known by the enti re populace. Oates was considered a national hero, and the Council started disa rming Papis ts and arrest ing persons accused by Oates . Thus, the persec ution of Catholics and especia lly
Jesuits began . Many fled the country . Houses were searched and businesses
ruined. Prisons became filled wi th thos e who would not take the oath of allegia nce and supremacy . Severe laws not normally enforced were used against th e
papist community . Oates was lod~ed in Ifhitehall under g uard for pr otection
and granted a pension of twelve-hundred pounds a year for his efforts . While
a few doubted the truth of his fantastic s t a tements, those who hated the Catholics were eage r to bel i eve his lies . Rumors were circulated to incite a general state of terror among the people . Men and women alike went armed . Soon
everyone was reluctant to disa gree with Oates for fear of being labeled a
Papist. ll By November 30 , 1678 a ll the Pop ish Lords were expelled from the
House by refusing to swear t o the Pu rliamentary Test Act, with the exceptio n
of three who did . Those in the Commons did take the oa th. 12
Oat es ' positio n was f ur ther enhanced by two events which seemed to substantia t e his statements . The first was the seizur e of treasonable letters
written by Coleman, Secretary to the Duchess of York, t o French Jesui t s . ~~ile
there was nothing in them about murder or conspiracy , they did allude t o the
day that James would succeed his brother upon the throne and the ultimate rise
of Roman Catholicism in England with the help of French money . These statements
were looked upon by the Council as supporting proof o f the conspiracy revealed
by Oates . It has been no t ed that Coleman was pe rha ps the only one of Oates '
victims who was trul y guil ty of a crime . 13 The importance of this event is
reveal ed by a contemporary John Evelyn, in speaking about the much later tria l
of William Howard, Viscount Stafford:
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Such a man's testimony should not be taken against the life of
a dog. But the merit of something material which he discovered
against Coleman, put him in such esteem with the Parliament,
that now, I fancy, he stuck at nothing, and thought everybody
was to take what he said for gospel.l 4
The second event beneficial to Oates was the disappearance of Sir Edmund
Godfrey. Godfrey, a staunch Protestant magistrate, had witnessed the depositions of Oates earlier in September. In the middle of October he vanished,
and five days later his body was discovered. Even before the discovery, it
was rumored that he had been murdered by Papists. Though the actual mystery
of his death has never been solved, this incident added fuel to the fire that
Oates had already set. Godfrey's body was found with his own sword through
it, but medical examination revealed that he had been previously strangled .
Rumors spread that Godfrey had been murdered by Papists because he had helped
in publishing their plot. The Country Party--la ter known as l.Jhigs--led by
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftsbury, seized on the opportunity to stir
up anti-Catholic feeling against the monarchy. The chief aim of this group
was to secure a Protestant succession to the throne. By pointing out the
horror of a Catholic monarch, his group hoped to discredit Charles, James and
Danby and break up the existing House of Commons. Godfrey's corpse was used
to add to the panic already initiated by Oates. It was exhibited for public
view and guards were posted to protect the minister who performed the funeral
ceremony. Even though Shaftsbury may not have been a party to Oates ' original
plot, he used it to the fullest extent to gain his a..n objectives . 1S
Opposing the Country Party were the Tories or supporters of the monarch.
The Tories as well as Charles could not afford to openly refute the accusations
made by Oates for fear of being added to his next list of conspirators. On
November 9, 1678, in his speech to both houses Charles, in essence, agreed to
support the Catholic persecution which was to follow for the next two years.
He did stress, however, that any measures taken should not interfere with the
rightful succession of James to the throne when he stated:
And therefore I am come to assure you, that whatsoever Bills
you shall present, to be passed into laws, to make you safe
in the reign of my Successor, (so they tend not to impeach
the Right of Succession, nor the descent of the crown in the
true line; and so as they restrain not my power, nor the just
rights of any Protestant Successor.) shall find from me a
ready concurrence. And I desire you withal, to think of some
effectual means for the conviction of Popish Recusants, and
to expedite your councils as fast as you can, that the world
may see our unanimity . and that I may have an opportunity of
showing you how ready I am to do anything that may give comfort and satisfaction to such dutiful and loyal subjects."16
On this wave of popular sentiment, Oates ' reputation grew and he continued
to invest new incriminating evidence to insure his position. At this point
other disreputable informers sought to share in Oates' rewards by confirming
his statements and adding their own details. More and more people were accused.
Any connection with the Catholic faith left persons open to attack. On November 24, 1678, Oates went so far as to openly accuse the Queen of being a party
to the conspiracy to murder her husband and to haVing arranged the assassination
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of Godfrey . Oates was encouraged by the Country Party which had long been in
favor of the King ' s divorcing Catherine who was a Catholic. His subsequent marriage to a Protestant they hoped would insure a Protestant s uc cession . Though
Charles was known to be unfaithful to Catherine, he proved loyal in this instance
and wo uld not permit her to fall vi c tim to Oates. Having considerable support
in the House of Lords, Catherine was exonerated. Severe cross -examination of
Oates and the oth r major informer, Hilliam Bedloe, exposed considerable incon sistencies in their testimony. Oates was thrown in prison for a time, but three
of the Queen ' s servants as well as Coleman were convicted . 17
Coleman's was the first of the plot trials. Though he was convicted and
subseq uently executed on December 3rd, his trial began the effe ctual discredit ing of Oates. Under cross - examina ti on Oates ' technical reliability began to
waver . Soon his testimo ny alone was not sufficient to convict the Jesuits he
accused and ot her informers had to be produced . A string of convictions and
executions ensued . Charles was forced to sign the executions of men he knew
to be innocent . Firs t came the executions of th e Jesuits Ireland, Pickeri ng
and Grove , accused of conspiracy to murder the King. Next came the executions
of Green, Berry, and Hill, supposed murderers of Godfrey . In June 1679 , those
executed were Ifhitbread, Provincial of the English Jesuits, and Fenwick, Harcourt, Gavan, and Turner (other priests) also accused of conspiring to murder
the King . In addition, Richard Langhorn , a Catholic lawyer , fell victim .
Langhorn was accused of raising a Papist army to invade England . Thirty-seven
deaths h.we been attributed to the per;ured testimony of Oates and his fellow
informers . IS
The first major r everse occurred fo r Oates and his gang when they attempted
to incriminate Samuel Pepys as a means of attacking James, Duke of York . Pepys
had been chief advisor to James when he had been Lord High Admiral . The gr oup
attempted to ge t to Pepys throu gh his cle rk , Samuel Atkins . The plan was t o
acc use Atkins of complicity in Godfrey ' s murder in hopes t hat Atkins would testi fy against Pepys in his fear of being arrested . However , t he pla n backfir ed
when Atkins not only refused to lie, but also produced a reliable alibi to pr ove
his own innocence . Mr. Pepys, cha r ged with being a Roman Catholic , was commi t ted t o the tower on Hay 22 , 1679. Because the pla nn ed evidence was not fo rthcomi ng , he was released on June 2nd on bail of thirty - thousand po unds . On J une
30, 16S0, he was finally discharged without a trial . 19
A second major set-back for Oa tes IJas the acq uittal of Sir Geo r ge I,akeman,
the Queen's physiCian , and three Benedi t brothers on July lS , 1679 . The four
were accused of conspiracy to poison the King and subvert the Protestant r eli gion . The reason is not clearly identified why the Chief Jus t ice did not support the informers but instead proved their testimony to be crimi nally perj ured.
The effect of this acquittal was th e division of the nation in t o two ha l ves-those who saw that t hey had been deceived and those who remained fait h ful to
Oates . The la t ter were fas t declining in number . Though restored somewha t by
the sham "Heal Tub Plot" i n October 1679, Oates ' prestige suffered ev en mo r e
damage in J une of l6S0 when the Earl of Castlemai n was acquitted in spi t e of
Oates ' testimony to the effect that Castlemain "had been i n correspondence wi t h
t he Spanish Jes uits as well as St . Omers about the ' design . ", 20
The continued decline of Oa tes ' fol lm.ers is evidenced by t he r eac tion
to the trial a nd conviction of Viscount Stafford i n Nov ember- December l6S0 fo r
treason:
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The people knew him to be blameless, except for his religion,
and that the evidence given at his trial was one long tissue
of lies by Shaftsbury's paid informers . Slowly their sanity
was returning . 21
By the time the last victim, Oliver Plunket, was executed , Oates' popularity had diminished greatly . Plunket, an Irish Archbishop, was hanged, drawn,
and quartered on July 1, 1681. Again, Charles was aware that this victim was
in nocent, but he did nothing to save Plunket because "his [Charles] enemies were
still waiting for him to make a false step."22 However, in September 1681,
Charles at last began to turn on the informers. Stephen College, a Whig intimate of many of the Plot witnesses was executed in August 1681 in spite of Oates'
testimony in his defense. A week later his allowance from the King was entirely
cut off and he was fo rbidden to appear at court . Oates' weekly allowance for
mai ntenance had never been large in view of his residence at h~itehall Palace.
Its reduction had begun in July 1680, and had always been temporary as he never
received a funded pension for life from Charles. It is supposed that Shaftsbury
paid some amount to Oates, but that is not certain. He did receive some money
in lump sums as the author of his Narrative and other works: The Cabinet of the
Jesuits' Secrets Opened, An Exact Discovery of the Mystery of Iniquity as it is
now in Practice amongst the Jesuits, and The Pope's Warehouse, or, the Merchandise of the Whore of Rome, all published in 1679. During this time, a Tory
journalist Sir Roger l'Estrange was periodically attacking the inconsistencies
of Oates' original evidence. The nation gradually began to realize that Oates'
plot was a fraud exploited by Shaftsbury for the purpose of excluding the "Papist"
James II from succession . At age 3D, Oates was again living on charity.23
In 1683, discovery of the "Rye House Plot ," a conspiracy by Whig radicals
to assassinate both the King and the Duke of York further destroyed Oates' most
powerful supporters. However, he did not give up easily; in 1684 he petitioned
the Bishop of London asking "how the government could in good conscience license
denials of a Plot in which it had several times announced its belief."24 This
was to no avail as the Duke of York had been reinstated and loyal ism was now
the order of the day . On May 10th he was arrested for a treasonable remark
made about the Duke of York in April 1680 . Having no defense, he was charged
one-hundred thousand pounds damages a nd thrown in debtors' prison . Further
charges were brought against him for perjury and he was placed in chains . Two
days after the death of Charles II his trial began. It focused on the perjured
evidence he had given at the trial of Ireland, Grove, and Pickering on December
17, 1678. No la~er would defend him and witnesses he called would not support
his statements. 25
In spite of Oates' adept defense in his own behalf, he was found guilty of
perjury. The judges, noting that "sentence of death or mutilation was no longer
legal," issued a sentence meant to serve the same end.

In addition to a fine

and being "unfrocked," he was sentenced to life imprisonment with annual appearances in the pillory. Before starting his imprisonment, he was to be whipped
from Aldgate to Newgate; then after a day's rest from Newgate to Tyburn. The
total distance was three and one-ha lf miles. The fact that he survived to be
imprisoned was remarkable. He remained in prison for the rest of James' reign
with periodic appearances in the pillory as sentenced. \fuen the "Glorious
Revolution" came in 1688, he was freed. In 1689 he petitioned the House of
Lords for a reversal of his sentence. Though he was granted a free pardon by
William III, his conviction stood, and he was barred from appearing as a witness
in any court of law. In addition, he was forbidden to practice his "priestly
calling . " 26
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Upon request by the Commons, he was granted a meager a llowance of ten
pounds per week from \~illiam III. This was later increased to a "lump sum of
five-hundred pounds , and three- hundred pounds a year" in place of his allowance .
Oates remained friendly with the "old Whig extremists , " and publicized his feel ing of martyrdom t hr ough his book A Display of Tyranny, which dealt with his
treatmen t hy James II . John Evelyn noted that \~illiam III did not approve of
this book . 27
The days of pl ott i ng and discove r y of plots had come to an end . The fea r
of pope r y , as i n t he days of Charles II, had subsided ; Oates could no lo nger
fi nd an a udi ence f or his tales of fiendish "designs " a gainst the monarch or
himself . I n view of his circumstances , Oa t es was fo r ced to undergo a perso na l
transformation . I n 1693 he abandoned his homosexuality and mar r ied a "wea lthy
ci ty widow , " pr obab l y t o impr ove his financial s t a tus . In 1698 he effected a
second change when he became a member of t he Baptist clergy at Wapping. However,
he continued to live up to his reputation as evidenced by his explusion in 1 701 ,
after several scandals . Titus Oates, a man whose perjured lies caused the exe cution or ruin of numerous innocent people in 1678- 79 , was a free man liv i ng
on a fu nded pen s ion on July 12, 1705 , when he died at the age of 56-- i n t he
opinion of some , 56 years t oo late . 2o
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